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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF
HUMAN SERVICES ex rel. CATHY
A. PARKER,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

Case No. 930583-CA

v.
HARRY D. IRIZARRY,
Defendant and Appellee.
PETITION FOR REHEARING

This case arises out of a paternity action filed by Cathy
Parker in May 1989 against Harry Irizarry, the unmarried father of
twin girls born in April 1985.

In addition to ongoing child

support from May 1989 forward, which the trial court ordered
Irizarry to pay after he acknowledged paternity, Parker sought a
judgment against Irizarry for child support attributable to the
four years before she filed the paternity action.
Ann. § 78-45a-3 (1992).

See Utah Code

The trial court denied this pre-filing

child support claim based on equitable estoppel.
Appellant State of Utah, Department of Human Services asserted
the following two issues on appeal:
•

Can equitable estoppel apply to bar recovery of child

support from an unwed, biological father for the four years
before the paternity action was filed?
•

If so, do the trial court's findings here--that Parker,

while pregnant, communicated to Irizarry she wanted nothing to
1

do with him--nonetheless fail as a matter of law to show the
prerequisite

elements

of

estoppel,

including

reasonable

reliance by Irizarry on statements or conduct by Parker
inconsistent with her claim for pre-filing child support in
the subsequent paternity action?
This Court issued a decision in the case (Addendum A) on April
13, 1995, that affirms the trial court's denial of Parker's claim
for four years of pre-filing child support.

Appellant files this

Petition for Rehearing pursuant to rule 35, Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, on two grounds.
First, it is unclear which of the two opinions, the lead
opinion by Judge Bench or the concurring opinion by Judge Wilkins,
is intended to be the decision of a majority of the appellate panel
members.

Second, the concurring opinion seems to conclude that

(1) current Utah law allows application of estoppel to bar recovery
of child support for the four years before filing of the paternity
action, but

(2) the biological father in this case could not

reasonably have relied on the mother's statements or conduct,
before she gave birth, communicating that she wanted nothing to do
with him and did not want his support.
If the second conclusion has been reached by two judges of
this Court, the result on appeal should be reversal of the trial
court's ruling on the estoppel issue and remand for entry of a
judgment against Irizarry for the four pre-filing years of child
support. Yet, the concurring opinion confusingly purports to agree
with the result reached by Judge Bench, which is affirmance of the

2

trial court's application of estoppel to deny Parker's pre-filing
child support claim.
CERTIFICATION
Appellant's counsel certifies that this Petition for Rehearing
is presented in good faith and not for delay.

Clarification of

which views are those of a majority of the Court and clarification
of

the

actual

majority

view

about

the

unreasonableness

or

reasonableness of any reliance by Irizarry on Parker's statements
is necessary to give clear direction to trial judges who enter
child support judgments against biological fathers in the thousands
of paternity cases filed in Utah each year.1

ARGUMENT
I.

IT IS UNCLEAR WHICH OF THE TWO OPINIONS IS
MEANT TO REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF A MAJORITY OF
THE APPELLATE COURT PANELISTS ON THE ISSUES
RESOLVED.

In the lead opinion, Judge Bench affirms the trial court's
ruling that Parker, as a result of her statements to Irizarry
before the twins were born, should be estopped from recovering from
him any pre-filing child support. No other judge concurred in the
lead opinion.
In the opinion that immediately follows, Judge Wilkins begins
by stating, "I concur in the result reached by the majority
opinion."

Addendum A, slip op. at 6.

lr

However, the published

There were 2,883 reported filings of paternity cases in Utah
in 1993. National Center for State Courts, Examining the Work of
State Courts, 1993 30 (1995).
3

decision later shows Judge Billings as joining only in Judge
Wilkins' concurring opinion. If the published decision accurately
reflects Judge Billings' vote in this case, then Judge Wilkins'
concurring opinion is the majority opinion and reference in his
opinion to any other "majority opinion" should be deleted.
On the other hand, if the published

decision

does not

accurately reflect Judge Billings' vote in this case, Judge Bench's
lead opinion could be the majority opinion to which Judge Wilkins
refers.

If this is the case, correction of the mistake would

reveal Judge Bench's conclusion, i.e., that Irizarry's reliance was
reasonable, to be that of "the Court" for purposes of identifying
the

binding

precedent

set

by

the

decision

in this appeal.

Appellant respectfully requests that this ambiguity in the
decision issued April 13 be dispelled on rehearing.

II.

IF TWO JUDGES AGREE THAT IRIZARRY'S RELIANCE
ON PARKER'S STATEMENTS IS UNREASONABLE AS A
MATTER OF LAW# THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN DENYING, ON THE BASIS OF
ESTOPPEL, PARKER'S CLAIM FOR PRE-FILING CHILD
SUPPORT.

As the Court is aware, equitable estoppel requires proof of
three elements:

(1) a statement, admission, act or failure to act

that is inconsistent with a later-asserted claim; (2) action or
inaction in reasonable reliance on such by the party asserting
estoppel as a shield; and

(3) injury to the party asserting

estoppel that would result if the other party were allowed to
repudiate

the statement, admission, act, or failure to act.

Consolidation Coal Co. v. Utah Div. of State Lands & Forestry, 886
4

P.2d 514, 522 (Utah 1994); Trolley Square Assocs. v. Nielson, 886
P.2d 61, 65 (Utah App. 1994).
Relying heavily on the application of estoppel on similar
facts in Burrow v. Vrontikis, 788 .P.2d 1046 (Utah App. 1990), Judge
Bench concludes in the lead opinion that Irizarry reasonably relied
on three statements of Parker, during her pregnancy, that she
wanted nothing to do with him.

On the other hand, the concurring

opinion takes the opposite view.
notwithstanding

the

According to Judge Wilkins,

fact-dependent

nature

of

estoppel

determinations, "reasonable reliance by a father in an action such
as

this

should

require

more

supporting

evidence

than

mere

communications or conduct by the mother occurring prior to her
actually providing the child support." Addendum A, slip op. at 10.
Judge Wilkins adds:
It stretches the limits of reasonability to suggest
that Mr. Irizarry can reasonably rely on conduct or
communications of Ms. Parker that she will, in the
future, relieve him of a legal obligation and will
thereafter not assert a personal right acquired as
a result of such future conduct.
Id.

(emphasis in original).

Thus, Judge Wilkins appears to

conclude that, as a matter of law, any reliance by Irizarry on
Parker's statements before the children were born could not have
been reasonable.

If this is the conclusion reached by Judges

Wilkins and Billings, a majority of the Court has determined that
Irizarry failed to establish one of the necessary elements of
estoppel; therefore, the trial court's refusal, based on estoppel,
to award Parker pre-filing child support constitutes an abuse of
discretion.

See, e.g..

Ross v. Ross, 5922 P.2d 600 (Utah 1979).
5

To remedy this, the trial judge's ruling in favor of Irizarry on
the estoppel issue should be reversed and the case remanded for
entry of a dollar judgment against Irizarry for four years of child
support that accrued before the paternity action was filed.
The concurring opinion, however, inexplicably states at the
outset that it agrees with the result of affirmance of the trial
court.

Addendum A, slip op. at 6.

expressly

favored

by

the

Thus, the ultimate result

concurring

opinion

irreconcilably

conflicts with its reasoning and conclusion on the issue of the
unreasonableness of Irizarry's reliance.
The message sent by the multiple-opinion decision affirming
the trial court in this case is that a biological father can use
estoppel to avoid paying pre-filing child support, a claim for
which section 78-45a-3 authorizes recovery, by merely showing he
detrimentally relied on the mother's statements or conduct, whether
or not that reliance is reasonable.

Such a relaxation of estoppel

standards to defeat an unwed father's statutory obligation to
support his biological child is unprecedented and undesirable. It
flatly contradicts the concurring opinion's strong view that
application of estoppel in the child support context "should be
severely limited and should not be invoked lightly."

Addendum A,

slip. op. at 9.
CONCLUSION
Appellant requests that the Petition for Rehearing be granted
and that the decision issued April 13 be withdrawn and reissued in

6

amended form, so that Judge Wilkins' concurring opinion--assuming
joinder by one other panelist--becomes the majority opinion that:
concludes

Irizarry's

reliance

on

Parker's

statements

is

unreasonable as a matter of law; reverses the trial court's ruling
on Irizarry's estoppel claim; and remands for entry of judgment
against Irizarry for support of his twin daughters accruing from
May 1985 to May 1989.
Respectfully submitted this

day of April, 1995.

BILLY L. WALKER (#3358)
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
This is to certify that I caused to be mailed, by first-dass
postage prepaid, two copies of the foregoing Petition for Rehearing
to the following counsel for Appellee this ^ ^
Elisabeth R. Blattner
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
201 South Main Suite 1800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
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day of April, 1995:

ADDENDUM A

FILfcU
This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
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State of Utah. Department of
Human Services, ex rel. Cathy
A. Parker,

OPINION
(For Publication)

Plaintiffs and Appellant,

Case No. 930583-CA

v.

F I L E D
( A p r i l 1 3 , 1995)

Harry D. Irizarry,
Defendant and Appellee.

Third District, Salt Lake County
The Honorable David E. Roth
The Honorable Tyrone Medley
Attorneys:

Jan Graham, Linda Luinstra, and Billy L. Walker, Salt
Lake City, for Appellant
Barbara K. Polich and Elisabeth R. Blattner, Salt
Lake City, for Appellee

Before Judges Bench, Billings, and Wilkins.
BENCH, Judge:
The Department of Social Services of the State of Utah (the
State), on behalf of Cathy Parker, appeals the trial court's
application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel to prevent Ms.
Parker's recovery of reimbursement for past child support from
Harry Irizarry. We affirm.
FACTS
In June 1984, Ms. Parker and Mr. Irizarry met and began
dating. Shortly thereafter, Ms. Parker became pregnant. After
discovering she was pregnant, Ms. Parker temporarily moved from
Utah to California. That August, Mr. Irizarry visited Ms. Parker
in California and learned that she was pregnant. He then
returned to Salt Lake City.

Mr. Irizarry testified that in September he sent a letter
with some money to Ms. Parker, which she kept. He said that he
followed up the letter with a telephone call. The trial court
found that during this telephone call Ms. Parker stated that she
did not want any money and would take care of herself. Mr.
Irizarry testified that in November he sent another letter with
approximately twenty dollars, and followed that letter with
another telephone call. The trial court found that Ms. Parker
again said she wanted nothing to do with him. Mr. Irizarry
called again in January 1985. The trial court found that during
this call she once again said she wanted nothing to do with him.
In April 1985, Ms. Parker gave birth to twin girls. Ms. Parker
left Mr. Irizarry's name off the twins' birth certificates.
In October 1985, Mr. Irizarry married his present wife and
moved to Puerto Rico until September 1987, when they returned to
Salt Lake City. He and his wife now have four children. Ms.
Parker became aware of Mr. Irizarry's return to Salt Lake City in
November 1988.
On May 30, 1989, the State filed a paternity action on Ms.
Parker's behalf to establish that Mr. Irizarry is the father of
the twins and to fix a support obligation from the time of their
birth. Mr. Irizarry acknowledged his paternity by stipulation
shortly after the complaint was filed and a temporary support
order was set. After a trial in February 1993, the trial court
entered a judgment holding Mr. Irizarry responsible for ongoing
child support and for back child support from the time this
action was filed. However, the trial court found that Ms. Parker
was equitably estopped from collecting past due child support
from the date of the twins' birth until the paternity action was
filed. This determination was based on the statements Ms. Parker
made to Mr. Irizarry before the twins' birth to the effect that
she did not want any money or involvement from Mr. Irizarry. The
State now appeals the trial court's application of equitable
estoppel.
ANALYSIS
The issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred by
applying equitable estoppel to bar Ms. Parker's claim for
reimbursement of back child support she has furnished.1
1. The issue of whether a mother can relieve a father from
current or future support obligations is not before us; nor is
the issue presented of whether a mother's statements or acts can
prejudice the children's or the State's rights to seek past
(continued...)
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(E]quitable estoppel is *a highly fact-dependent question, one
that we cannot profitably review de novo in every case because we
cannot hope to work out a coherent statement of the law through a
course of such decisions.'" Trolley Square Assocs. v. Nielson.
886 P.2d 61, 65 (Utah App. 1994) (quoting State v. Pena. 869 P.2d
932, 938 (Utah 1994)); accord Terrv v. Price Mun. Corp. 784 P.2d
146, 148 (Utah 1989). We will not overturn the trial court's
application of equitable estoppel absent an abuse of discretion.
Trolley Square, 886 P.2d at 65.
In Baaos v. Anderson, 528 P.2d 141 (Utah 1974), the Utah
Supreme Court discussed the distinction between reimbursement for
past due support and future support:
it is appropriate to point out that support
money can fall into two separate categories:
First, the current and ongoing right of a
child to receive support money from his
father (parent); and second, the right to
receive reimbursement for support of a child
after that has been done. As to the second,
suppose a father (parent) fails over a period
of time to furnish support of the child, and
the mother, or someone else, furnishes it.
That person then has the right to claim
reimbursement from the parent, the same as
any other past debt. The right of
reimbursement belongs to whoever furnished
the support; and it is subject to
negotiation, settlement, satisfaction or
discharge in the same manner as any other
debt.
I£. at 143. While the court in Baaas ultimately refused to apply
the doctrine of equitable estoppel because the claims asserted
were for current and future support, it held that the right to
reimbursement for past support already furnished was a debt
subject to legal and equitable doctrines. Is£.; see also Borland
v. Chandler, 733 P.2d 144, 146 (Utah 1987) (holding that
equitable doctrines, such as estoppel, apply in statutory
paternity actions); Wasescha v. Wasescha. 548 P.2d 895, 896 (Utah
1976) (holding that one who provided back child support may be
estopped from seeking reimbursement for money expended).

1. (...continued)
support from a father. The only issue in this case concerns Ms.
Parker's claim for reimbursement of child support she has already
provided.

930583-CA
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In Burrow v, Vrontikis. 788 P.2d 1046 (Utah App. 1990), on
facts similar to the present case, this court applied equitable
estoppel consistent with Borland. Wasescha. and Baaas to a claim
for reimbursement for past support• In Burrow, the mother gave
birth out of wedlock. Following the birth of the child, the
mother told a friend that she wanted nothing to do with the
father. The friend relayed this information to the father.
Relying on this information, the father married and incurred
additional financial obligations.
Seven years after the child's birth, the mother brought a
paternity action seeking reimbursement for back child support.
The father argued that the mother should be barred from receiving
back child support by the doctrines of laches and/or equitable
estoppel. The trial court concluded, based on Zito v. Chandler.
584 P.2d 868 (Utah 1978) (per curiam), that equitable doctrines
were not available in statutory paternity actions and awarded the
mother four years back child support consistent with Utah Code
Ann. § 78-45a-3. The father appealed*
During the course of the appeal, the supreme court overruled
Zito and, as earlier expressed in Wasescha and Bacras. held that
equitable defenses such as laches and equitable estoppel are
available in paternity actions. See Borland. 733 P.2d at 146.
Relying on Borland, this court reversed and remanded for a
determination of whether laches and/or equitable estoppel barred
the mother's action. Burrow. 788 P.2d at 1047.
On remand, the trial court applied equitable estoppel and
found that: (1) the mother had unreasonably delayed the filing
of her claim for past child support; (2) the mother's delay
amounted to more than mere silence because of her representations
that she wanted nothing to do with the father; and (3) the father
reasonably relied upon the mother's representations. Based on
its findings, the trial court concluded that the mother's claim
for past child support was barred by the doctrine of equitable
estoppel. J&. at 1048. The mother appealed.
In the second appeal, this court restated the doctrine of
equitable estoppel:
"Estoppel is an equitable doctrine which
precludes parties from asserting their rights
where their actions render it inequitable to
allow them to assert those rights. Estoppel
requires proof of three elements: (1) a
statement, admission, act, or failure to act
by one party inconsistent with a laterasserted claim; (2) the other party's
reasonable action or inaction based upon the

930583-CA
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first party's statement, admission, actf or
failure to act; and (3) injury to the second
party that would result from allowing the
first party to contradict or repudiate its
statement, admission, act, or failure to
act.11
Id., at 1048 (quoting Brixen & Christopher. Architects v. Elton.
777 P.2d 1039, 1043-44 (Utah App. 1989) (citations omitted)).
This court upheld the trial court's application of equitable
estoppel and ruled that the mother's claim for reimbursement of
back child support was barred:
First, it is uncontroverted that
appellant failed to make any request or to
take any action to require respondent to pay
back child support for seven years. This was
an unreasonable delay. Further, with
adequate evidentiary support, the trial court
found that appellant made statements to a
mutual friend inconsistent with requiring
respondent to pay child support/ which she
knew or should have known would be
communicated to respondent and, in fact,
were. This behavior is inconsistent with her
present claim that respondent owes her $7,200
for past child support.
Second, respondent failed to pay support
for those seven years because he reasonably
relied upon both appellant's failure to take
any overt action to require him to pay, and
upon her communication to the mutual friend
that she did not want anything to do with him
and that she would handle the rearing of the
child herself. Thus, respondent's failure to
pay child support was based upon more than
mere silence. • . •
Third, as a result of this reliance,
respondent assumed other obligations, both in
his personal life and in his business, that
would have been tempered had he been aware of
the need and obligation to support the child.

Id.
The trial court in the present case made findings with
respect to each element of equitable estoppel. First, the trial
court found that Ms. Parker "made statements [and] took actions

930583-CA
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that led [Mr. Irizarry] to reasonably conclude that she wanted
nothing to do with him and didn't want his support." Second, the
trial court found that it was reasonable for Mr. Irizarry to rely
on Ms. Parker's statements and actions. Third, the trial court
found that, in reliance on Ms. Parker's statements and actions,
Mr. Irizarry married and incurred additional expenses. The trial
court's findings are supported by the evidence. Based upon these
findings, the trial court concluded that Ms. Parker was estopped
from receiving reimbursement for child support furnished prior to
the filing of this action.
Ms. Parker made at least three statements that she wanted
nothing to do with Mr. Irizarry and that she would take care of
herself. Unlike the father in Burrow. Mr. Irizarry was the one
who initiated the contacts between the parties in order to
determine whether Ms. Parker needed his assistance. Ms. Parker's
statements, in contrast to those of the mother in Burrow, were
made directly to the father so that there was no question that he
was aware of and understood Ms. Parker's position. The substance
of Ms. Parker's statements, however, bear a striking resemblance
to the mother's statements in Burrow. If anything, Ms. Parker's
statements were clearer and more concise than the statements made
in Burrow. Ms. Parker's decision to leave Mr. Irizarry off of
the birth certificates also supports the trial court's decision.
Like the father in Burrow, Mr. Irizarry reasonably relied on Ms.
Parker's statements and married and incurred additional financial
obligations. Under Burrow. the trial court in the present case
was clearly acting within its discretion by ruling that Ms.
Parker was estopped from receiving reimbursement for back child
support.
CONCLUSION
The trial court properly denied Ms. Parker's request for
reimbursement of past child support under the doctrine of
equitable estoppel. The trial court's ruling is affirmed.

KU*Ul. Bench, Judge
WILKINS, Judge (concurring in the result):
I concur in the result reached by the majority opinion.
However, I believe it.is the policy of the law in this instance

930583-CA
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to hold both parents fully accountable for the support of their
children.
Estoppel is "an equitable doctrine which precludes parties
from asserting their Town] rights where their Town! actions
render it inequitable to allow them to assert those rights."
Brixen & Christopher. Architects v. Elton, 777 P.2d 1039, 1043
(Utah App. 1989) (emphasis added). Application of this doctrine
in a child support context should be significantly limited.
It has long been recognized that the child's right to
receive current or future support is his or her own and "is not
subject to being bartered away, or estopped, or in any way
defeated by the conduct of the parents or others." Baaas v.
Anderson. 528 P.2d 141, 143 (Utah 1974); see also Larsen v.
Larsen, 5 Utah 2d 224, 227, 300 P.2d 596, 598 (1956); Price v.
Price. 4 Utah 2d 153, 154, 289 P.2d 1044, 1044 (1955) ("Future
child support effectively cannot be the subject of bargain and
sale. Among ether things, the State is an interested party in
such matters since a child's welfare is at stake.").
In the case of a child support obligation arising in a
paternity context, the interested parties are the child, parents,
and the State. The child has a right to support from his or her
parents. Utah Code Ann. SS 78-45-3 (1992) (duty of father to
support his child), 78-45-4 (1992) (duty of mother to support her
child), 78-45a-l (1992) (duty of father of child born outside
marriage same as father of child born within marriage).
In a paternity action, the claim for past child support is
already limited to four years by statute. Utah Code Ann. § 7845a-3 (1992) ("The father's liability for past education and
necessary support are limited to a period of four years next
preceding the commencement of a [paternity] action."). In fact,
the State argues that this statute provides adequate financial
protection for the biological father, and thus should be read to
preempt the availability of equitable estoppel as an additional
protection.
Unfortunately, current case law prevents us from accepting
the State's argument. In Zito v. Butler, 584 P.2d 868 (Utah
1978) (per curiam), the mother of a child brought a paternity
action against the father over four years after the child's
birth. The mother was awarded past child support, limited only
by section 78-45a-3, which, as noted above, limits the father's
liability to a period of four years next preceding the
commencement of an action. The father sought to invoke the
equitable doctrines of estoppel and laches in addition to the
limitation already imposed by section 78-45a-3. The per curiam
decision of the supreme court held summarily that these equitable

930583-CA
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doctrines do not apply in a statutory action.
869.

Zito. 584 P.2d at

However, this reasoning was expressly overruled in Borland
v. Chandler. 733 P.2d 144 (Utah 1987). In Borland, the father
attempted to raise a defense of laches to a paternity action
brought seven years after the birth of the child. The court held
that while laches did not apply to the facts of that case, it was
nevertheless available as a defense in a paternity action. The
court stated:
At common law, an equitable defense could not
be raised to a legal action, and because a
statutory action was legal in nature,
equitable defenses would not apply. This
seems to be the theory behind Zito. a per
curiam opinion. However, Utah long ago
abolished any formal distinction between law
and equity. It is well established that
equitable defenses may be applied in actions
at law and that principles of equity apply
wherever necessary to prevent injustice.
Therefore, it is clear that under appropriate
circumstances, laches may bar an action for
paternity. . . . Therefore, we conclude that
to the extent that Zito stands for the
proposition that an equitable defense is not
available, it is an incorrect statement of
the law and is overruled.
X£. at 146 (citations omitted)•
The supreme court in Borland was not faced with the specific
question of whether equitable estoppel can defeat a mother's
claim for reimbursement of past child support, given the fouryear limitation already imposed by section 78-45a-3. The court
did not specifically address whether the four-year limitation was
intended to preclude the application of equitable estoppel as to
those four years. However, since the four-year limitation on
past child support was part of the Zito case, and the supreme
court overruled Zito in broad terms without reserving the
question of the specific preemptive power of this legislative
limitation, we must infer from Borland that the court views the
defense of equitable estoppel as available in an action to
recover past child support accruing within the four-year period
prior to the filing of the paternity action. This court so
relied on Borland in Burrow v. Vrontikis. 788 P.2d 1046 (Utah
App. 1990), when it sanctioned the use of equitable estoppel as a
defense to a mother's claim for back child support in a paternity
action.
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Based on gjto, Borland, and Burrow, we are now forced to
conclude that the defense of equitable estoppel to a claim for
reimbursement of past child support has not been preempted by the
four year limitation of section 78-45a-3. There is no clear
indication that section 78-45a-3 is intended to be the only
possible limitation to any obligation arising from a child
support obligation.
The doctrine of equitable estoppel is intended to prevent
the sometimes harsh rule of law from working an unfairness
between two parties. In a child support context, and as the law
now stands, equitable estoppel is applicable between the parents
after the child's rights are discharged. The courts are at
liberty to use equitable estoppel as a tool to strike what is
believed to be a fair balance between the mother and the father.
However, the balance struck between the mother and father has a
residual effect on the interests of the child and the State.
Those interests suggest that the balance should be tilted in
favor of the parent who actually furnishes support to the child.
So, while equitable estoppel presently has an application in this
area, its application should be severely limited and should not
be invoked lightly.
In this case, the trial court found that Ms. Parker made
statements prior to the birth of the children to the effect that
she did not want Mr. Irizarry's money, or to have anything to do
with him, but that at the same time she kept money proffered by
him.2 At the time she made those statements, Ms. Parker had not
expended funds in support of the twins. However, the current
case law reveals that reviewing courts have failed to require
strict application of the facts to the correct legal standard of
equitable estoppel. Utah courts require reasonable reliance, in
the form of action or inaction, as one of the elements of
equitable estoppel. See, e.g. . Trolley Scruare Assoc, v. Nielson.
886 P.2d 61, 65 (Utah App. 1994); Burrow. 788 P.2d at 1048.
Recognizing that such a determination is "a highly fact-dependent
question,w Trolley Square, 886 P.2d at 65, to nevertheless find
2. The trial court found that Ms. Parker made three statements
to Mr. Irizarry: (1) In September 1984, Ms. Parker told Mr.
Irizarry over the telephone that "she didn't want any money and
would take care of herself.11 (2) After he sent a letter, Mr.
Irizarry made a follow-up call to Ms. Parker in November 1984 and
91
once again she said she wanted nothing to do with [Mr.
Irizarry].w (3) In January 1985, Mr. Irizarry called Ms. Parker
and "once again the plaintiff said she wanted nothing to do with
him.M In April 1985, the twins were born. The findings are
supported by the evidence and, thus, are not clearly erroneous.
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reasonable reliance by a father in an action such as this should
require more supporting evidence than mere communications or
conduct by the mother occurring prior to her actually providing
the child support.
In the present case, Mr. Irizarry seeks to estop Ms. Parker
from asserting her right to reimbursement. At the time of the
conduct and communications relied on by Mr. Irizarry, Ms. Parker
had no right to reimbursement simply because she had not yet
furnished the support. Indeed, w[t]he right of reimbursement
belongs to whoever furnish^ the support." Baaas. 528 P.2d at
143 (emphasis added). It stretches the limits of reasonability
to suggest that Mr. Irizarry can reasonably rely on conduct or
communications of Ms. Parker that she will, in the future,
relieve him of a legal obligation and will thereafter not assert
a personal right acquired as a result of such future conduct. It
would seem only logical that to act reasonably in not reimbursing
Ms. Parker for the support she provided, Mr. Irizarry would have
to have some knowledge that Ms. Parker actually provided that
support.
Furthermore, although the application of equitable estoppel
to the statements and actions of Ms. Parker prior to the birth of
the twins is in keeping with the present state of the law, it
leaves in jeopardy the interests of not only the children, but
also those of the State. Perhaps the question of when equitable
estoppel should apply in a paternity action for past child
support will be addressed by the legislature in order to give
full effect to the underlying duty of a father to support his
children. It is clear that the legislature intends that this
responsibility be taken seriously, lest the children suffer or
become a public charge. See Utah Code Ann. SS 62A-11-101, -104
(1992).

I CONCUR IN THE CONCURRING OPINION OP JUDGE WILKINS:

TJudith M. Billings, Judge

930583-CA

10

